蒸氣足跡

他們在媒介希望促進的公共關係組織和新聞辦公室很好是熟練的在吹片斷、空洞的宣言關於產品和服務。 經常，媒介在重要新聞領土吮這樣吹片斷，不僅作為補白在精瘦的時期，但，如果吹片斷足够性感，不管所有真正的缺乏物質，它將傳播virally。 我們全部看見了吮吸者標題宣佈突破，下件大事，名人背書，穿著或行為古怪的人事件等等。

媒介聯繫官員在計算機行業比喜歡沒有較不有罪的 nutraceutical製造商HDTV公司和其他，在吹滅這樣吹片斷。 但，計算機行業和具體地事務的軟件邊，有它PR吹- vaporware的自己的專業版本!

我們全部知道關於軟件，免費軟件，并且共享軟件，您也許甚而遇到了公司名稱和產品像netware和openware。 當wetware，與那裡是相對硬件和大家那些日子畏懼malware，腦子經常被談論。 但， vaporware ？

寫在 技術行銷國際定期刊物 (2008年， 3， 116-136)，營銷永川堡教授，事務和經濟學院在加利福尼亞州立大學在Fullerton，引述vaporware的定義如下：

企業前宣佈一個新產品的交貨日期的營銷戰略，但在被許諾的日期不故意地交付產品。

1982年期限vaporware由微軟工程師最初鑄造描述精疲力竭的軟件項目，但這個定義由無法投遞的定義在前公告代替了。

現在，為什麼軟件製造將販賣vaporware ？ 它是有義務引起很多媒介興趣為產品的一個引入歧途的營銷戰略，那麼明顯地引起意料在消費者之中，但最後失望當公司在特定日期時未能投擲。 它是像得到為聖誕節做準備及早在12月只獲悉在24个大天被投入了回到2月17日!

好處對營銷vaporware軟件公司共同地被察覺是他們可以擋住相似的產品的公告從敵手公司並且很好引起持續的興趣在媒介之中在真正交貨日期之前。 堡指出它共同地被認為vaporware是主要商號的非產品。

然而，在這中最新的研究到vaporware，堡裡質詢傳統觀念并且顯示出， vaporware戰略的成功取決於交易在市場結冰的作用和食肉作用之間。 Specifically, he says, vaporware is actually an effective strategy only for companies with a sufficiently low market share and for new products that offer a large improvement in quality and features over existing products on the market.

Bao points out that occasionally what might be seen as a vaporware product may be a genuine announcement and subsequent technical delays, an honest error in forecasting delivery date perhaps caused by R&D problems or bugs discovered late in beta testing. Vaporware is certainly a fact of life backed up by statistics and incidents. Recent alleged examples discussed across the blogosphere include Microsoft’s Xbox Live Anywhere on Vista (Vista itself was vaporware for a long time), the XO 2.0 laptop from OLPC, the Linux phone operating system, OpenMoko, and PCWorld magazine offers an interesting Top 15 of all-time vaporware products and Crave has a feature on some of the more peculiar examples of vaporware. And, of course, it remains to be seen whether Windows 7 (the touch-sensitive successor to XP/Vista) is merely PR puff to ward off migrations to Linux.

There have been several instances of vaporware that have significantly impacted in a detrimental way on the products and the companies peddling the vaporware. For instance, Lotus’s 1-2-3 spreadsheet was more than a year late in delivery, which allowed Microsoft and Surpass to enter that market sector, while Lotus apparently rested on its laurels. Borland nudged its way into the word processor market soon after WordPerfect preannounced their new word processor, which was delayed by nine months.

So, asks Bao, why do some firms engage in vaporware even when the strategy apparently cannot deter competitor entry into the market? General market dominance does not seem to be a factor, according to Bao. Indeed, Palm’s pre-announcement and subsequent delay of its new m500 PDA in 2001 led to massive losses and the disposal of staff and cancellation of a new plant. Vaporware is not cheap talk, says Bao.

In conclusion, Bao suggests that vaporware really is only optimal for a firm with a sufficiently low market share and for a truly innovative, or significantly improved, product. “To eliminate the vaporware incentive, he proposes a signaling price mechanism.” His mathematical analysis of this proposal shows perhaps counterintuitively that a lower price signals better product delivery capability. “The analysis of the proposal is not statistical in nature but purely mathematical,” Bao told Sciencetext, “I employed a game-theoretic method to analyze the signaling mechanism. Whether or not it works in the real world calls for an empirical test.”

So, are we likely to see the end of PR puff pieces and vaporware? What do you think?